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Strike: Mandatory Sentencing

NOTE

CUSTIS v. UNITED STATES: ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR CONVICTIONS
BEING USED TO INCREASE PRISON TERMS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Custis v. United States/ the Supreme Court held that
persons convicted in federal court whose sentences were enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (hereinafter
"ACCA"),2 may not collaterally attack3 the constitutionality of
their prior convictions. 4 The ACCA increases the penalty for
possession of a firearm by a felon from a maximum ten year
sentence to a mandatory fifteen year minimum sentence when
the person convicted has three prior convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses. 6 The Court noted that a conviction obtained when the defendant was without counsel may

1. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J.,
in which O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsberg, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., joined).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). The ACCA provides for a mandatory fifteen year
minimum sentence for certain firearm violations when the person convicted has
three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. See infra note
44 in which the statutory language is reproduced.
3. The term "collateral attack" is used to describe "an attempt to avoid, defeat or evade [a judgment] or deny its force and effect in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it ...." BLACK's
LAw DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990). See also Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739 n.l
(Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.). "The Court's opinion
makes clear that it uses the phrase "collateral attack" to refer to an attack during
sentencing." Id.
4. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. The one exception to this rule allows "convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel" to be collaterally challenged. Id.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988). See infra note 44, in which the statutory
language is reproduced.
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be collaterally challenged,6 but held that the ACCA precluded
challenges to the constitutionality of prior convictions on other
grounds. 7
Consequently, the Court did not consider the alleged constitutional defects in Custis' prior convictions8 and allowed
them to be used to increase his sentence from a ten year maximum9 to 235 months in prison. 10 If the Court had permitted
Custis to challenge any of his prior convictions, and if he was
successful in doing so, he would have lacked the three prior
convictions necessary for sentence enhancement under the
ACCA.
This note will first explain the facts of Custis' case and
then discuss the background of the ACCA. The ACCA discussion will be followed by a review of the procedural history and
the Supreme Court's analysis of Custis' case. The note will
then offer a critique of the Court's interpretation of the language and legislative intent behind the ACCA. Finally, the
note will conclude that the Custis decision illustrates increasing judicial effort to curtail the availability of post-conviction
relief formerly available to criminal defendants.
II. FACTS
Darren J. Custis was arrested in Baltimore, Maryland on
July 1, 1991 and indicted for possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute;l1 possession of a firearm in connection with drug
trafficking;12 and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 13 Custis was convicted in United States District Court on
the latter firearm charge and of the lesser included offense of
cocaine possession. 14

See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734.
Id.
Id. at 1739.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (1988).
See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735.
United States v. Custis, 786 F. Supp. 533, 535 (D. Md. 1992); see 21
§ 841(a)(l) (1988).
Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l) (1988).
14. Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
U.S.C.
12.
13.
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Custis was previously convicted of robbery in Pennsylvania
state court in 1985,15 of burglary in Maryland state court in
1985,16 and of attempted burglary in Maryland state court in
1989. 17 These prior convictions constituted the three "dangerous felonies"lS necessary for sentence enhancement under the
ACCA, and the government moved to use them to increase
Custis' sentence for his firearm possession conviction. 19
Custis asserted that inadequate assistance of counsel rendered two of his prior convictions unconstitutional, and that
unconstitutional convictions should not be used to increase the
sentence imposed for a subsequent conviction. 20 Specifically,
Custis alleged that his guilty plea to the 1985 burglary charge
was on the advice of counsel and was not knowing and intelligent,21 as required by Boykin v. Alabama. 22 Custis' counsel
allegedly failed to advise him regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication; a defense Custis claimed he would have
raised had he been made aware of its existence.23 The tran-

15. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994).
16. See W.
17. See w.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1988) defines violent felonies for purposes of sen·
tence enhancement under the ACCA as:
any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, ... that - (i) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1988).
19. Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535.
20. [d. at 534.
21. [d.
22. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Boykin case is widely cited
to illustrate the requirement that a defendant be fully informed of the ramifications of a plea of guilty before the court may accept that plea.
Mr. Boykin pleaded guilty to five counts of robbery and was sentenced to
death. [d. at 239-40. The trial judge accepted his plea without questioning and
without informing him of its consequences. [d. at 239. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge's acceptance of defendant's guilty plea without
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary was plain error. [d.
at 242. The Court required defendants be made aware of the seriousness of a
guilty plea because it "supplies both evidence and verdict, ending [thel controversy." [d. at 242-43 n.4 (quoting Woodard v. State, 171 So. 2d 462, 469 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1965».
23. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734.
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script of Custis' guilty plea, which he provided for the district
court, affirmatively demonstrated that his lawyer did not advise him of any possible defenses, and that he was "confused"
during the guilty plea proceeding.24
Custis challenged his 1989 attempted burglary conviction
on the ground that it resulted from a "stipulated facts" trial. 25
He asserted that a trial on stipulated facts was essentially
equivalent to a guilty plea, and was unfair because he was not
adequately advised of his rights and did not enter a knowing
and voluntary plea. 26 Custis further alleged that the stipulated facts established only attempted breaking and entering, not
attempted burglary.27 He therefore reasoned that his conviction for attempted burglary was the result of ineffective assistance of counseI,28
The district court refused to consider Custis' allegations of
constitutional violations in his prior convictions,29 and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. 30 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Fourth Circuit
opinion conflicted with the decisions of several other circuits. 31 The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision32 dis24. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994)
(No. 93-5209). Petitioner's brief included the following excerpt from the Maryland
state court transcript:
THE COURT: Has [your lawyer) told you in the past the
pssible [sic) defense you might have in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: She has not told you what defenses you
might have had or that you didn't have any?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Has she discussed the case with you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, somewhat but it's been confusing.
THE COURT: What's been confusing?
THE DEFENDANT: The whole thing really has been
confusing.
1d. at 4 n.2.
25. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734.
26. See id.
27. 1d.
28.1d.
29. 1d. at 1735. See Custis, 786 F. Supp. at 535-36.
30. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735. See United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355,
1357 (4th Cir. 1993).
31. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735. At least eight other circuits had recently al-
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missing Custis' challenges to his prior convictions. 33
As a result of the application of ACCA sentence enhance-

ment provisions, Mr. Custis was sentenced to nearly twenty
years in prison without possibility of parole. 34 Absent his prior
convictions, his sentence would have been approximately three
years. 35
III. BACKGROUND OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL

ACT
The Armed Career Criminal Act was originally enacted as
part of section 1202(a) of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter "OCC Act").36
The OCC Act provided that a convicted felon who possesses,
receives, or transports a firearm in interstate commerce may
be sentenced to imprisonment for up to two years, fined up to
$10,000, or both. 37 The Act further provided that a convicted
felon who possesses, receives, or transports a firearm in interstate commerce and who has three prior convictions for robbery, burglary, or both,38 must receive a sentence of at least
lowed defendants to challenge prior convictions on constitutional grounds other
than absence of counsel. The First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have allowed challenges based on an involuntary and unknowing guilty
plea. See, e.g., United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 974-79 (lOth Cir. 1993);
United States v. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 11-13 (lst Cir. 1992); United States v. Day,
949 F.2d 973, 981·84 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ruo, 943 F.2d 1274, 127577 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir.
1990); and United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989). Further,
the Third and Ninth Circuits have allowed challenges based on the ineffective
assistance of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87-89 (3d
Cir. 1990); and United States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987).
See also Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735 n.1.
32. See United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993).
33. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734.
34. See id. at 1735.
35. See Brief for Petitioner at 5 n.4, Custis (No. 93-5209). Attorneys for petitioner cite the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, as prescribing a sentence ranging from thirty-three to forty-one months; approximately
three years. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines manual, §
4B1.4{a) (Nov. 1990). See generally David Cole, Criminals Called Out Before Fin·
ishing Their Chance at Bat, CONN. LAw TRIBUNE, March 28, 1994, at 18.
36. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202{a) (Supp. III 1985) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308
§ 104{b), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (l00 Stat.) 459) (recodified with amendments at 18
U.S.C. § 922{g) (1988».
37. Id.
38. See id. The underlying convictions necessary to trigger the ACCA were
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fifteen years imprisonment and be fined up to $25,000. 39 Persons convicted under the DCC Act were ineligible for suspended sentences, probation or parole. 40 The portion of the OCC
Act providing for increased sentences for convicted felons with
the prior designated convictions was termed the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984.41
On November 15, 1986, Congress repealed § 1202(a)42 but
recodified it into §§ 922(g)43 and 924(e)(1)44 of Title 18 of the
subsequently changed from "robbery, burglary, or both" to "three previous convic·
tions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense." [d. See also 18 U.S.C. §
924(e)(1) (1988).
39. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (Supp. III 1985) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308,
§ 104(b), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 459) (recodified with amendments at 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988».
40. See id.
41. [d. at § 1201.
42. Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b) 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 459.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms and reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice;
(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance . . . ;
(4) who has been a<ijudicated as a mental defective or
who has been committed to a mental institution;
(5) who, being an alien, is illegally or unlawfully in the
United States;
(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has
renounced his citizenship;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which pas
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
[d.

44. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988) states:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this
title and has three previous convictions by any court
referred to in section 922 (g)(l) of this title for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on
occasions different from one another, such person shall be
fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than
fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant
a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to
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United States Code. Despite minor modifications to the language of the code,45 the relocation was effectively a reenactment of the statute. 46
The ACCA prohibits courts from granting suspended sentences or probation to persons convicted under § 922(g). Persons convicted under § 922(g) are not eligible for parole with
respect to the sentence imposed under the ACCA. 47 While the
ACCA mandates a minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment,48 it does not specify a maximum penalty.49 Furthermore, because the ACCA is a sentence enhancement statute
and does not define substantive offenses,5o the prosecution is
not required to prove the defendant's prior convictions beyond
a reasonable doubt. 51 Therefore, if a defendant is convicted
under the ACCA statute, the court may impose a lifetime prison term52 without possibility of parole, simply by showing
the conviction under section 922(g), and such person shall
not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence
imposed under this subsection.
[d.

45. See supra note 38.
46. See H.R. No. 99-495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 1, 23, 26, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1352.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
48. [d.
49. See id.
50. See United States v. Lowe, 860 F.2d 1370, 1377 (7th Cir. 1988) (The Lowe
court stated that § 924 contains a sufficient number of common indicia of a sentence enhancement provision to establish Congress' intent to create one.). See gen·
erally Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (1988) (concluding that
Congress intended the ACCA to be a mechanism for sentence enhancement and
not a substantive offense).
51. See United States V. West, 826 F.2d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1987); see also
Buckley V. Butler, 825 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1738
(1988) (due process does not require that sentencing factors be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence).
52. See United States V. Brame, 997 F.2d 1426 (11th Cir. 1993). Defendant
Brame was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was subject
to sentence enhancement under the ACCA. [d. Brame contended that since the
ACCA specified only a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years and did not
specify an express maximum sentence, the maximum sentence should be some
term in excess of fifteen years but less than life imprisonment. [d. at 1428. The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and adopted the position of the other circuits that addressed the issue, holding that the maximum sentence under the ACCA is life
imprisonment. [d. (citing Walberg V. United States, 763 F.2d 143, 148-49 (2d Cir.
1985) (penalty statute that fails to provide explicit maximum period of imprisonment implicitly authorizes imposition of a maximum sentence of life».
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that the requisite prior convictions occurred. These sentences
stand in sharp contrast to those that would be imposed absent
a sentence enhancement provision. 53 Mr. Custis' sentence, for
example, was increased by approximately sixteen years because of his prior convictions. 54
Sentence enhancement legislation has been enacted in
various forms by most states in this country.55 The general
purpose of such laws is to deter repeat offenders; a group believed to be responsible for the majority of violent crimes in the
United States. 56 Anti-recidivism legislation has been unsuccessfully challenged on multiple constitutional grounds57 and
has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court. 68 The prohibition on collateral attacks to prior convictions announced in
Custis will have widespread impact if it is applied to defendants convicted under the myriad other anti-recidivism statutes currently in place in the United States. 59

53. See, e.g., United States v. Bronaugh, 895 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1990) (defendant was convicted of making a false statement to acquire a firearm and his sentence was increased five-fold under the ACCA).
54. See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, United States v. Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1732
(1994) (No. 93-5209).
55. See, e.g., 1994 Cal. Adv. Legis. Servo 12 (Deering) (California's recently
enacted "three strikes" law). See generally Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing
Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv. L. REV. 511 (1982) (stating
that as of 1979, recidivist statutes were in force in 44 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and at the federal level).
56. See H.R. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661-63.
57. See, e.g., United States V. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1236-37 (8th Cir. 1987)
(mandatory sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(2) does not violate due process
merely by divesting court of sentencing discretion); United States V. Gilliard, 847
F.2d 21, 25-27 (1st Cir. 1988) (fifteen year mandatory sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
924 does not violate eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment since statute focuses on violent crimes and seeks to remove guns from
the possession of violent criminals); United States V. Conner, 886 F.2d 984, 985
(8th Cir. 1989) (use of prior state court armed robbery convictions to enhance
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924 was not double jeopardy since conviction in state
court and conviction under § 924 resulted from charges brought by separate sovereigns for separate incidents).
58. See, e.g., Rummel V. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980); Spencer V. Texas,
385 U.S. 554, 559 (1967); Oyler V. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1962).
59. See generally Cole, supra note 35.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss2/2

8

Strike: Mandatory Sentencing

1995]

MANDATORY SENTENCING

275

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Maryland District Court initially reviewed Custis'
attacks on his prior convictions in a letter ruling. 60 The court
rejected Custis' assertion that his 1989 "stipulated facts" trial
for attempted burglary was the functional equivalent of a
guilty plea. 61 However, the court concluded that in Custis'
1985 burglary conviction, counsel's failure to discuss possible
defenses with the defendant could constitute performance below the applicable standards of professional competence. 62
The court deferred ruling on the matter, intending to hear
testimony at the sentencing hearing,63 but subsequently reversed its position and held that the Armed Career Criminal
Act "provides no statutory right to challenge prior convictions
relied on by the government for enhancement."64 That determination was based on the court's reading of the ACCA as prohibiting collateral challenges to prior convictions unless the
defendant was without counse1. 65 Since Custis asserted that
his prior convictions were rendered unconstitutional by ineffective counsel,66 rather than by absence of counsel, the district
court deemed those convictions not reviewable in that forum. 67
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court opinion. 68 The Fourth Circuit was concerned
with the "substantial burden" imposed on prosecutors and
district courts by a requirement that they conduct "fact-inten-

60. United States v. Custis, No. S 91·0334 (D. Md. filed Feb. 27, 1992).
61. See id. at 2-3.
62. See id. at 1. See also, Brief for Petitioner at 6, Custis v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (No. 93-5209).
63. See Custis, No. S 91-0334 at 2.
64. Custis v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 533, 535-36 (D. Md. 1992).
65. [d. at 536-37. The district court could not locate binding precedent from
the Fourth Circuit which addressed a defendant's right to collaterally attack prior
convictions on grounds other than absence of counsel. [d. It acknowledged that
other circuits had allowed such challenges but stated that a defendant's right to
such a challenge was of uncertain origin. 1d. The court concluded that, to the
extent those cases extended the right to collateral challenges to include cases not
involving absence of counsel, those decisions were unsound. [d.
66. [d. at 534.
67. 1d. at 537.
68. United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1993).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2

276

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:267

sive" inquiries into state court records that are likely to be
inadequate or unavailable. 69 The court also expressed concern
over issues of federalism 70 and comity,71 stating that "federal
courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials."72
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 73 because the
Fourth Circuit opinion conflicted with the decisions of Courts
of Appeals in several other circuits, which allowed defendants
to challenge the constitutional validity of prior convictions used
in sentencing under the ACCA. 74 Grounds for collateral attack
in other circuits included ineffective assistance of counsel,75
and an unknowing or involuntary guilty plea. 76
V. SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
1.

The Language of the ACCA

The majority77 began its analysis by interpreting the relevant language of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 78 The
ACCA provides for an increased sentence for any person who
possesses a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),9 and

69. Id. at 1361 (quoting United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105, 109 (4th Cir.
1992».
70. Federalism: "Term which includes interrelationships among the states and
the relationship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
71. Comity: "The principle in accordance with which the courts of one state or
jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a
matter of obligation but out of deference and respect." BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY
267 (6th ed. 1990).
72. Custis, 988 F.2d at 1361 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983».
73. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 299 (1994).
74. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (1994).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87-89 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Ruo, 943 F.2d
1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 642-43
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989).
77. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994) (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J.,
in which O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsberg, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., joined).
78. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (1994).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) reads in relevant part:
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who has "three previous convictions by any court referred to in
§ 922(g)(1) for a violent felony or a serious drug offense."80
The majority believed that Congress' use of the phrase "three
previous convictions," indicated its intent to allow sentences to
be increased based on the "fact of conviction" alone. s1 The majority concluded that the statute's failure to expressly provide a
means of challenging such convictions suggested that Congress
did not wish collateral attacks to be available. s2
Custis argued that even absent express statutory authorization, defendants have an implied right under § 924(e) to
challenge the constitutionality of prior convictions. s3 The
Court rejected that argument, citing a portion of the Gun Control Act of 1968,84 of which the ACCA is a part, as illustrative
of legislative intent: "Any conviction which has been expunged,
or set aside, or for which a person has been pardoned or has
had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction
for purposes of this chapter.,,85 The Court concluded that the
express statutory mention of convictions which were 'set aside'
created the negative implication that all convictions that had
not been set aside may be used to increase sentences under the
ACCA. 88
In support of its conclusion, the Court pointed to other
statutes enacted by Congress which contain sentence enhancement provisions and which expressly allow repeat offenders to
challenge prior convictions. s7 The existence of statutes which

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . ..
See supra, note 43, wherein the statutory language is reproduced.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
81. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1736.
82.Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).
85. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(20».
86. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1736 (emphasis added).
87. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 851(c) as an example). Section 851(c) is a part of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and states in
relevant part:
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allow such challenges at the time of sentencing convinced the
Court that Congress was capable of incorporating similar provisions into the ACCA, had it desired to do so. ss The Court
viewed the absence of such language in the ACCA as indicative
of a conscious legislative intent to prohibit collateral attacks on
prior convictions. s9

2.

Ineffective Counsel versus Absence of Counsel

Custis argued that regardless of whether the ACCA permitted attacks to prior convictions, the Constitution required
that they be allowed. 90 Custis cited Burgett v. Texas 91 and
United States v. Tucker 92 to support his right to challenge
constitutionally infirm predicate convictions. 93 In Burgett the
defendant was charged with assault with intent to murder. 94
The prosecution offered evidence of prior felony convictions
which, if proved, would have rendered the defendant subject to
life imprisonment for the current offense. 95 The trial judge acknowledged that one of the prior state court convictions had
been obtained without the defendant having legal counsel,96
and the court instructed the jury to disregard testimony relat-

(1) If the person denies any allegation of the information
of prior conviction, or claims that any conviction alleged
is invalid, he shall .file a written response to the information ....
(2) A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the
information was obtained in violation of the Constitution
of the United States shall set forth his claim, and the
factual basis therefor, with particularity in his response to
the information . . . .
21 U.S.C. § 861(c) (1988).
88. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1736.
89. Id.
90. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1994).
91. 389 U.S. 109 (1967) (introduction of constitutionally infirm prior conviction
was inherently prejudicial; use of such a conviction to enhance punishment for
another offense would allow an unconstitutional procedure to injure a defendant
twice).
92. 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (affirmed appellate court decision remanding case for
reconsideration of defendant's sentence because district court considered unconstitutional prior convictions when determining that sentence).
93. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1737.
94. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 110.
96. Id. at 111.
96. Id. at 112.
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ed to that prior unconstitutional conviction. 97 The defendant
was subsequently convicted of the assault charge9S but the
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that evidence of an unconstitutional prior conviction is inherently prejudicial, and instructions to disregard such testimony
do not adequately protect the defendant. 99
In Tucker, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery.loo The trial judge explicitly considered the defendant's
prior felony convictions when imposing the maximum sentence
of twenty-five years. 101 Two of the defendant's prior felony
convictions were later determined to have been obtained without counsel,102 rendering them constitutionally invalid. 103
The case was, therefore, remanded for resentencing. l04
The Court distinguished both Burgett and Tucker from
Custis' case, however, stating that the finding of unconstitutionality in both of the earlier cases was limited to violations
based on the holding in Gideon v. Wainwright. l05 Gideon held
that indigent defendants in state court proceedings were entitled to state-appointed counsel and the lack thereof rendered
any resulting conviction unconstitutional. l06 The Court held
that a complete absence of counsel is a "unique constitutional
defect" and thus has much greater significance than a claim of
inadequate counsel. l07 By interpreting Burgett and Tucker as
relevant only in absence of counsel cases, the Court precluded

97. 1d. at 112.

98. 1d. at 110.
99. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115-16.
100. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 443-44 (1972).
10l. 1d. at 444.
102. 1d. at 444-45. The Superior Court of Alameda County, California held in a
collateral proceeding that defendant's 1938 burglary conviction in Florida and his
1946 burglary conviction in Louisiana were obtained without defendant having the
assistance of counsel. See In re Tucker, 409 P.2d 921 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1966).
103. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444-45.
104. 1d. at 446.
105. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1737-38 (1994); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
106. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339-40 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for indigent defendants was not applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause without a showing of special circumstances).
107. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738.
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their application to Custis' case.
The Court cited Johnson v. Zerbst lO8 to support its conclusion that convictions obtained without counsel for defendant
are unique, and not applicable to Custis' case. 109 The Court
held in Johnson that failure to appoint counsel not only violated the Sixth Amendment,110 but gave the defendant the right
to collaterally attack his conviction via federal habeas corpus
review. l l l Prior to the Johnson decision, habeas review was
available to collaterally attack a conviction only when the
forum court lacked jurisdiction. 112 The Court effectively decided in Johnson that absence of counsel rose to the level of a
jurisdictional defect, and that a "conviction pronounced by a
court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus.,,113
The Court explained that its decisions, beginning with
Johnson over fifty years ago, and extending through the more
recent Burgett and Tucker opinions, illustrated that a conviction obtained when the defendant was without counsel is unconstitutional by virtue of a jurisdictional defect.114 The Court
believed that those cases illustrated that absence of counsel
cases have historically been viewed differently than cases
flawed by other constitutional violations. ll5 The Court found
no such historical evidence of unique treatment for convictions
that resulted from ineffective assistance of counselor an uninformed guilty plea, and concluded that they did not Buffer from

108. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
109. Custis, 114 s. ct. at 1738.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process in obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
ld.
111. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1737 (citing Johnson, 304 U.S. 458).
112. ld. (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 88 (1923».
113. [d. at 1737 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468) (quotation omitted).
114. ld. at 1738.
115. See id.
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the same jurisdictional flaw. 116 Accordingly, it held that convictions marred by constitutional flaws other than absence of
counsel are not subject to collateral attack during sentencing
under the ACCA. ll7
The Court cited ease of administration as additional justification for the distinction drawn between ineffective counsel
and absence of counsel. 118 While the absence of counsel would
be evident from the judgment roll,119 an attorney's effectiveness or the voluntariness of a defendant's guilty plea is not
readily determinable and may require examination of transcripts from the prior trials. 120 The Court expressed reluctance at requiring sentencing courts to examine state court
transcripts that may be difficult to obtain or nonexistent. 121
The Court further supported its conclusion by expressing
its concern with the finality of judgments. 122 Quoting its prior
opinion in United States v. Addonizio,123 the Court cautioned
that "[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine
confidence in the integrity of our procedures."124 The Court
was particularly concerned with the finality of judgments in
cases in which the defendant pleaded guilty, as Custis did to
the charges leading to his prior convictions. 125 The Court was
reluctant to create new avenues through which to attack convictions obtained by guilty pleas because the vast majority of
criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas. 126
116. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738.
117. See id.
118. 1d. at 1738-39.
119. 1d. at 1738.
120. 1d.
121. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738-39.
122. 1d. at 1739.
123. 442 U.S. 178 (1979). Addonizio, former Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, was
convicted of conspiracy and sixty-three separate counts of extortion while in office.
1d. at 180 n.2. When modifications in the policies of the United States Parole
Commission resulted in Addonizio serving a longer sentence than that anticipated
by the sentencing judge, Addonizio appealed, asserting that his sentence was contrary to the judge's intent. 1d. at 180-82. The Supreme Court denied his right to
collaterally attack his sentence, citing as partial justification for its holding, its
concern with the finality of judgments. 1d. at 184-87.
124. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739 (quoting Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 n.11) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
125. 1d.
126. See id. at 1739; see also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784
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Availability of Habeas Review

The Court recognized that a defendant who is "in custody"127 for prior convictions during sentencing under the
ACCA, is free to challenge the prior convictions directly in the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted or through federal habeas review. 128 Once a sentence has expired, however, the defendant is no longer in custody for that conviction and habeas
review is unavailable. 129 The possibility that a defendant's
prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentence imposed
for a subsequent conviction does not renew his status as "in
custody" for the prior conviction. 130
The Court stated that because Custis was still in custody
for his prior convictions at the time of his sentencing under the
ACCA,13l he was free to seek habeas review of those earlier
convictions. 132 The Court also stated that if Custis successfully attacked the constitutionality of any of the prior convictions,
he could apply to have his sentence under the ACCA reopened. 133

(1979).
127. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989). Maleng defined "in custody" to
include the period of time before a sentence is fully expired, even though the
prisoner has been released from physical confinement. ld. at 491-92. A prisoner
released on parole is thus viewed as remaining in custody for purposes of habeas
review. ld.
128. CustiS, 114 S. Ct. at 1739; see also Maleng, 490 U.S. at 490-91 (referring
to 21 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to define the relevant circumstances under which a court
may grant a writ of habeas corpus: (c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend
to a prisoner unless-(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States . . . .).
129. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (holding that once a prisoner's sentence has
completely expired, the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance
the sentence for a subsequent conviction is not sufficient to render an individual
"in custody").
130. See id.
131. Neither the Supreme Court opinion (Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1732 (1994» nor the
opinions below (Custis, 786 F. Supp 533 (1992), Custis, 988 F.2d 1355 (1993»
explain why Custis remained "in custody" at the time of his sentencing. The Supreme Court opinion stated that Custis may directly attack his state court convictions "in Maryland." Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739. As Custis was not physically imprisoned for prior convictions at the time of his ACCA sentencing, it can be inferred that he was on parole for one of the prior convictions in Maryland. This
would account for his status as "in custody" at the time of his ACCA sentencing.
132. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739.
133. ld.
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Summary of Majority's Holding

To summarize, the majority concluded that the ACCA as
written does not expressly provide a defendant with the right
to collaterally attack a prior conviction used to enhance the
sentence imposed under that statute. 134 The Court recognized
that convictions obtained without the defendant having legal
counsel suffer from a constitutional flaw that has historically
been regarded as unique, and that those convictions rise to the
level of a jurisdictional defect.135 Accordingly, those convictions should not be used to enhance the sentence imposed for a
subsequent conviction, and may be collaterally attacked. 136
However, convictions which are alleged to be unconstitutional
by virtue of inadequate assistance of counselor an uninformed
guilty plea are not flawed to the same degree as convictions
marred by absence of counsel. 137 The Court, therefore, reasoned that those convictions must be attacked directly in the
rendering forum or through federal habeas corpus review. 136
Because Custis' allegations of constitutional error were based
on ineffective assistance of counsel and an uninformed guilty
plea, the Court held that they were not subject to review in the
federal sentencing forum. 139 The Court acknowledged that because Custis was in custody for his prior felony convictions at
the time of his sentencing under the ACCA, habeas review remained available to him.140
B.

DISSENTING OPINION

1.

Conflicting Decisions From Other Circuits

The dissene 4l began by noting that with the single exception of the Fourth Circuit holding below/42 United States

134. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1734 (1994).
135. [d. at 1736-38.
136. [d.
137. [d.
138. [d. at 1739.
139. Custis, 114 S. Ct at 1739.
140. [d.
141. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1739 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, J.J.).
142. See United States v. Custis, 786 F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1992).
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Courts of Appeals had consistently interpreted the ACCA as
allowing sentence enhancement based on prior "lawful" convictions, and have allowed defendants to demonstrate at sentencing that prior convictions were unlawfully obtained. 143 Constitutional challenges to prior convictions have been based on
absence of counsel, which the majority concurs is permissible,
but also on ineffective assistance of counsel,l44 and an unknowing or involuntary guilty plea;145 the same constitutional
infirmities Custis claimed. 146
The dissent observed that despite the numerous appellate
decisions which allowed collateral challenges to convictions
which were rendered unconstitutional by flaws other than
absence of counsel, Congress has not amended the ACCA to
expressly prohibit such challenges. 147 The dissent pointed out
that Congress has amended the language of § 924 several
times 148 but left the relevant portion of the ACCA unchanged. 149 The dissent reasoned that Congress' failure to express legislative disagreement with the appellate holdings
cited above was a clear indication of approval. 150 Thus, the
dissent concluded that Congress must have intended to allow
challenges for constitutional flaws other than absence of counsel. 151 The dissent found support for its conclusion in Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston,152 in which the Court said, "[i]n
light of [a] well established judicial interpretation [of a statutory provision], Congress' decision to leave [the provision] intact
suggests that Congress ratified the interpretation."153

143. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct 1732, 1739-40 (1994).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 87-89 (3d Cir. 1990); United States V. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1987).
145. See, e.g., United States V. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 1993); United States V. Paleo, 967 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1992); United States V. Ruo, 943 F.2d
1274, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 1991); United States V. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.
1990); United States V. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1989).
146. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734.
147. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1740-41.
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 924 (1988) (listing amendments following the text of the
code).
149. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1740.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983).
153. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1741 (quoting Herman & MacLean V. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983» (alteration in original> (quotation omitted).
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Misreading of Burgett and Tucker Cases

The dissent criticized the majority's interpretation of the
Burgett 1M and Tucker166 opinions as overly narrow. 156 The
majority concluded that the right recognized in those cases to
collaterally attack prior sentences was limited to the right to
have counsel present. 167 The dissent asserted that Burgett
and Tucker were better read as embodying the broader principle that a sentence may not be enhanced by a conviction the
defendant can show was obtained in violation of any constitutional right. 158 The dissent found support for its interpretation of Burgett and Tucker in appellate opinions that "consistently read [Burgett and Tucker] as requiring courts to entertain claims that prior convictions relied on for enhancement
were unconstitutional for reasons other than Gideon violations."159 Two of the cases the dissent cited involved the same
constitutional errors that Custis alleged were present in his
prior convictions: unknowing or involuntary guilty plea (United
States v. Martinez)160 and ineffective assistance of counsel
(Brown v. United States).161
In Brown, the defendant was convicted of interstate transportation of forged securities. 162 He alleged that his sentence
was improperly enhanced because of prior unconstitutional
state court convictions. 16s Defendant averred that the guilty

154. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
155. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
156. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1743-44 (1994).
157. [d. at 1738.
158. See id.
159. [d. at 1740 & n.3 (citing the following cases, which allowed collateral attack for reasons other than absence of counsel: United States v. Mancusi, 442 F.2d
561 (2d Cir. 1971) (confrontation clause); Jefferson v. United States, 488 F.2d 391,
393 (5th Cir. 1974) (self-incrimination); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61
(7th Cir. 1969) (unknowing and involuntary guilty plea); Taylor v. United States,
472 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1973) (self-incrimination); Brown v. United
States, 610 F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1980) (ineffective assistance of counsel);
Martinez v. United States, 464 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1972) (self·incrimination».
160. See United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969) (unknowing
and involuntary guilty plea).
161. See Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1980) (ineffective assistance of counsel).
162. [d. at 674.
163. [d.
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plea in one of those convictions resulted from police threats
and coercion and that his attorney improperly disregarded
those circumstances. 164 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
. potential ineffective counsel issue and remanded the case for
reconsideration of the defendant's sentence,165 stating that "it
is clear that the right to the assistance of counsel and the right
to effective assistance of counsel are constitutional equivalents."l66
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of an unknowing
or involuntary guilty plea in Martinez. 167 Martinez was convicted of a narcotics violation and his sentence was increased
because of a prior narcotics conviction. 16s Defendant alleged
that his guilty plea in the previous conviction was uninformed. 169 Based on the defendant's potentially uninformed
guilty plea, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court
opinion denying Martinez the right to challenge his prior conviction, and remanded the case to determine the validity of the
prior conviction. 170 The court rejected the argument that the
validity of the prior conviction would be difficult to determine,
stating that "[i]f the district court has the power to strike invalid prior convictions, it is only fundamental that the same
court with its inherent fact finding power and incidental power
to conduct hearings can determine which prior convictions are
invalid."l7l
The dissent further supported its contention that the
Burgett and Tucker holdings were not intended to be limited to
absence of counsel cases by quoting text from both opinions: "a
sentence may not be founded [even] in part upon misinforma-

164. Id.
165. Id. at 677.
166. Brown, 610 F.2d at 675.
167. United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969).
168. Id. at 61-62.
169. See id. at 62-63. Martinez was a Spanish·speaking citizen who required the
assistance of an interpreter. Id. at 62. He alleged that his interpreter spoke Span·
ish very poorly and as a result, Martinez was unclear about the law and was not
adequately advised of his right to a jury trial. Id. Martinez further alleged that he
pleaded guilty solely because he was undergoing withdrawal symptoms and was
promised treatment for his drug problem if he pleaded guilty. Id.
170. Id. at 64.
171. Id.
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tion of constitutional magnitude,172 because to do so would be
to allow the underlying right to be denied anew and to suffer
serious erosion."173 The dissent explained that the Burgett
and Tucker courts referred to Gideon 174 because the right to
be represented by counsel, as established in Gideon, was the
specific right at issue in those cases. 175 The Burgett and
Tucker courts' discussions of Gideon were not intended to limit
permissible collateral attacks to the specific constitutional
violation suffered by Mr. Gideon, but were intended to be "illustrative of the limitations the Constitution places on state
criminal procedures."176
Moreover, the dissent saw no adequate justification for the
distinction the majority drew between absence of counsel, a
flaw which can be collaterally attacked, and ineffective assistance of counsel, which cannot be collaterally attacked. 177 The
dissent asserted that the Sixth Amendment's178 guarantee of
assistance of counsel is not a mere formality, and compliance is
not ensured simply by having an attorney present at trial,
because "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.,,179 The dissent further argued that a conviction marred by an uninformed or involuntary guilty plea merits no more consideration for purposes of sentence enhancement than do convictions obtained without counsel. 18D In both
instances, defendants are deprived of rights guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. 181
172. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443,
447 (1972».
.
173. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1743 (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 116
(1967» (quotation omitted).
174. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants in state court criminal trials must have counsel appointed for them).
175. Custis, 114 S. Ct. 1743.
176. 1d. (quoting Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114) (quotation omitted).
177. 1d. at 1744.
178. See supra note 110, in which the language of the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution is reproduced.
179. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1744 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970»
(quotation omitted).
180. See W.
181. 1d. (comparing the right to be represented by counsel to the Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to confront adverse witnesses; both of which are
impermissibly forfeited by a defendant who unknowingly or unwillingly pleads
guilty).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2

288

3.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:267

Statutory Interpretation

The dissent also criticized the majority's conclusion that
the absence of express statutory language permitting collateral
attacks was an intentional omission. 182 The dissent cautioned
that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius 183 is a
flawed assumption when applied to the interpretation of statutes and that all legislative omissions are not necessarily deliberate. l84 The dissent further questioned the majority's logic
by pointing out that Congress was equally capable of expressly
precluding collateral attacks, yet chose to omit that language
from the statute as well. 185

4.

Ease of Administration

Finally, the dissent questioned the "ease of administration" that the majority contended would result from disallowing collateral attacks. 186 The dissent argued that collateral
attacks on prior convictions used to enhance sentences under
the ACCA have been taking place in federal courts for nearly a
decade,187 and at no time has any action been taken to relieve
the judicial burden anticipated by the majority.188 The dissent also pointed out that the burden of locating the necessary
state court records, which the majority feared may be difficult
to obtain, will fall on the defendant rather than the sentencing
court. 189 Lastly, the dissent contended that collateral attacks
182. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1741 (1994).
183. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius: "The expression of one thing - is
the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
184. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1741 (citing Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 813 (1983); and Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 MARv. L. REv. 863, 873·74 (1930». Both articles cau·
tioned that the legislature is not omniscient, and therefore, it is unwise to assume
that all omissions are deliberate.
185. Id. at 1742.
186. Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1746 (1994).
187. Id. at 1746, 1740 n.2; see also supra notes 75 & 76 and accompanying
text, wherein several appellate cases are listed in which collateral attacks were
allowed. The earliest of those cases was United States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909,
914-15 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the Ninth Circuit allowed a collateral challenge to
a conviction enhanced under 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor of section
924(e). See supra notes 36-59 and accompanying text.
188. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1746.
189. Id. ("[N]o one disagrees that the burden of showing the invalidity of prior
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during sentencing may in fact increase judicial efficiency.19o
Because the option of federal habeas review is open to a defendant seeking to challenge a prior conviction,191 allowing that
challenge to be heard at the time of sentencing would eliminate the need to evaluate a habeas review at a later date in
another proceeding. 192
VI. CRITIQUE
As the dissent persuasively argued, the absence of an

express provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act allowing
collateral attacks to prior sentences is far from an express
prohibition of collateral attacks. 193 If an inference regarding
legislative intent is to be drawn from a blank slate, the more
compelling conclusion is that reached by the dissent: Congress
did not intend to foreclose collateral review of convictions used
to enhance sentences under the ACCA. 194 Congress failed to
amend the ACCA, despite the fact that courts in at least eight
circuits have interpreted it as allowing collateral attacks based
on a variety of constitutional infirmities. 195 This fact strongly
supports the dissent's conclusion that Congressional intent was
not misinterpreted by the appellate courts which allowed collateral review. 196
Also tenuous is the majority's distinction between a defendant deprived of counsel and a defendant who suffered ineffective assistance counsel. 197 The Court has long recognized the
constitutional requirement 198 that defendants have the assis-·

convictions would rest on the defendants.").
190. [d. at 1746·47.
191. Habeas review will remain open to the defendant as long as he remains in
custody for that conviction. See supra notes 127 & 128.
192. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1746·47.
193. See Custis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1741·42 (1994).
194. See W.
195. See id. at 1739·40 ("Courts of Appeals . . . (with the one exception of the
court below) have understood "convictio[nl" in the ACCA to mean "lawful convic·
tion," and have permitted defendants to show at sentencing that a prior conviction
offered for enhancement was unconstitutionally obtained ....").
196. See id.
197. See id. at 1737·38.
198. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
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tance of counsel. 199 In Strickland v. Washington, the Court
further defined the protection mandated by the Constitution to
include the assistance of effective counse1. 200 The Court declared in Strickland, "[t]hat a person who happens to be a
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is
not enough to satisfy the constitutional command.,,201 In
Custis, however, the Court prohibited a defendant from showing that ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced a conviction,202 despite the fact that the prejudiced conviction would
be used to dramatically increase the defendant's prison sentence. 203 Reconciling Custis with Strickland is difficult:
Strickland would make void a conviction obtained without
effective assistance of counsel, but Custis would allow that
same unappealed conviction to be used against a defendant for
sentencing purposes.
The Custis prohibition against collateral challenges yields
similar anomalous results when applied to other constitutional
violations. For instance, Boykin v. Alabama204 held that it
was plain error to accept an involuntary or uninformed guilty
plea and a conviction resulting from such a plea was void. 205
Yet, despite the Court's recognition that such a plea renders
the resulting conviction unreliable, it authorizes the use of
such convictions to increase prison sentences under the
ACCA. 206 Convictions obtained under any of these circumstances are flawed and potentially erroneous, and as such, they
should not be used to increase prison terms for subsequent
convictions.

199. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 468 (1938) (Sixth Amendment entitles
criminal defendants to assistance of counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (fundamental right to assistance of counsel applicable to state courts by
Fourteenth Amendment).
200. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
201. [d. at 686.
202. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738.
203. Custis was sentenced under the ACCA to nearly twenty years; absent the
application of the ACCA sentence enhancement provisions, his sentence would have
been approximately three years. See supra note 36.
204. 396 U.S. 238 (1969).
206. [d. at 242 (trial judge erred when he accepted Boykin's guilty plea without
ascertaining whether it was voluntary and informed; the Court reversed Boykin's
conviction).
206. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738·39.
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Why then, does the Court permit potentially flawed convictions to be used against defendants for sentencing purposes?
The answer appears to lie with the Court's concern with ease
of administration and finality of judgments.
The chief distinction between reviewable and non-reviewable constitutional claims appears to be their relative "ease of
administration." If the flaw rendering a prior conviction invalid is readily apparent from the transcript of the rendering
court, as would be the absence of counsel, the majority is willing to allow that defect to be challenged during sentencing. 207
However, if the sentencing court is required to assess the merits of a less obvious violation, the Court appears willing to
forego constitutional protection. 208 Presumably, this concern
with ease of administration stems from increasingly overcrowded court dockets. 209
The majority also cited finality of judgments as a major
policy reason supporting its decision. 210 However, even if ensuring the finality of judgments is sufficiently important to
warrant denying defendants the right to challenge some constitutionally infirm prior convictions, the Custis decision is unlikely to achieve that goal. 211 Many defendants do not currently appeal their convictions because they may be nearing
release or may be unable to afford the cost of an appeal. 212
However, when the consequence of an unappealed prior unconstitutional conviction may be life imprisonment through sentence enhancement, defendants are likely to pursue every
available form of post-conviction review.21S ''Thus, in the interest of finality, the government's position will create an in-

207. See id.
208. See id.
209. For an in-depth analysis of the impact of the increasing federal caseload,
see Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and .PerceilJed "Bureaucracy" of the
Federal Courts: A Causation· Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Reme·
dies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871 (1983).
210. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739.
211. See David Cole, Criminals Called Out Before Finishing Their Chance At
Bat, CONN. L. THIB., Mar. 28, 1994, at 18. Mr. Cole's article focuses on the effect
the then-impending Supreme Court opinion in Custis would have on the general
type of legislation referred to as "three strikes" laws.
212. See id.
213. See id.
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centive for an unending stream of post-conviction proceedings
that would otherwise never occur."214
The limits the Court placed on collateral review of prior
convictions in Custis are analogous to the steps the Court has
taken over the past several years to curtail access to habeas
corpus review: 215
Over the past fifteen years, virtually every Term
of the Supreme Court has brought new and
substantial limits on the availability of federal
habeas corpus. On the procedural side, the Court
has foreclosed relief, with narrow exceptions, to
state prisoners who have failed to preserve their
claims in state court, lost on the merits of their
claims in prior federal petitions, or failed to
raise issues that could have been raised in prior
filings. On the substantive side, the Court has
withdrawn habeas review of Fourth Amendment
exclusionary-rule claims that have been (or
could have been) fully litigated in state court
and sharply limited the retroactive application
of "new" constitutional decisions. 218

In 1989, in Teague v. Lane,217 the Court so limited access
to habeas review that some commentators believed the decision
"sounded the death knell of habeas corpus as a vehicle for the
protection of defendants' rights.,,218 The Court held in a plurality opinion that "new rules,,219 would not be applicable to
cases pending on habeas corpus review unless those rules fit
214. Id.
215. See generally Jordan Streiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 303 (1993) (providing a comprehensive overview of the transition that habeas
corpus has undergone in the United States).
216. Id. at 303·04 (footnotes omitted).
217. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague Court held that new
rules could not be applied retroactively to benefit petitioners seeking habeas reo
view. Id. at 305·10. Thus, petitioners were precluded from benefiting from new
rules that would have changed the results of the petitioners' trials, had the new
rules been in effect at the time the petitioner was tried. Id. at 311·15.
218. See Marc A. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal
Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991). The Arkin article thor·
oughly explores the restrictive effects Teague has had on habeas review.
219. Justice O'Connor explained that "a case defines a new rule if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction be·
came final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
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into two narrow exceptions. 22o Some of the critics of the
Court's decision in Teague concluded that the Court was placing its concern with the finality of judgments above its concern
for constitutional protection of criminal defendants: "While the
interests of finality are all well and good, it is a troubling rule
indeed which permits one person to be executed and another to
stay alive simply because of the date on which a petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is denied."221
Another author concluded that "[b]y placing too high a value
on the finality of state court convictions, the Court has forgotten what had once been the central issue of federal habeas
corpus - whether or not a prisoner's conviction is constitutional."222

The steps the Court has taken to mInImIZe the role of
habeas review are tailored to significantly reduce the avenues
of post-conviction relief available to criminal defendants. 223
Similarly, the Court is attempting in the Custis decision to
achieve finality in judgments by restricting the challenges that
a defendant may bring against prior convictions in a collateral
forum. The same criticisms made against the reduced availability of habeas review are valid criticisms of the Custis decision - the Court is striving to solve logistical problems at the
expense of constitutional protection.
If, in fact, the Court is attempting to curtail opportunities
220. [d. at 305·10. The first exception was for rules that "place, as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe" (quoting justice Harlan in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). The second
exception applied only to new procedural rules that were "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" (quoting Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937». Unless a new rule of criminal procedure fit into one of those two
exceptions, the rule would not be applied retroactively to benefit a prisoner seeking habeas review.
221. Arkin, supra note 218, at 418.
222. Timothy Finley, Habeas Corpus - Retroactivity of Post Conviction Rulings:
Finality at the Expense of Justice, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 975 (1990) (exploring the effect that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), has had on subsequent cases).
223. See, e.g., Eliot F. Krieger, Recent Development: The Court Declines in Fair·
ness - Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 164,
182 (1990) ("The Teague bar may effectively slam the door on most Federal review
of state criminal cases and permanently stunt the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence.").
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for post-conviction relief for criminal defendants that it perceives as excessive, it should address that issue more candidly
than it did in Custis. While the majority opinion mentions
briefly the issues of finality of judgments and ease of administration, it does not identify these issues as primary concerns.
Instead the Court shrouds its holding in a lengthy discussion
of legislative intent and statutory interpretation of the ACCA.
VII. CONCLUSION
By interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act in the
restrictive manner that it has, the Supreme Court has virtually guaranteed that some defendants' sentences will be increased based on prior unconstitutional convictions. The Supreme Court has interpreted the United States Constitution as
prohibiting convictions which result from ineffective counsel224 or from unknowing or involuntary guilty pleas. 226 Yet,
the Court is quite willing to allow prison sentences to be increased based on convictions marred by those errors.
Despite the Court's asserted interpretation of the ACCA,
its purpose in Custis is not effecting the mandate of the legislature; its true policy is one of expedience. Just as availability
of habeas review has been significantly limited in recent
years,226 the Court is attempting in Custis to curtail what it
perceives as excessive opportunity for judicial delay through
collateral challenges to prior convictions.
By precluding collateral challenges to prior convictions, the
Court effectively declares that significant constitutional protection is unavailable in the sentencing forum. If the Court intends to limit the protection guaranteed by the United States
Constitution in the pursuit of expediency, it should at the very
least achieve that result. The Custis decision appears more
likely to result in a greater number of appeals and fewer guilty

224. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
225. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
226. See generally Streiker, supra note 215.
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pleas, thus exacerbating the very problem the Court sought to
remedy.

Barry W. Strike·

* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. The author wishes to
extend sincere thanks to Brian Albee and Sally Butros Strike for their invaluable
assistance in the completion of this note.
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